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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATNS-MMBERS AND STOcKxomEERs-FmuclRtY DUTY OWED A
CORPORATION BY MAzorry STOCKHOLDERS.-It was held in Insuranshares
Corporation of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corporation,' that share-
holders having control of a corporation owe a duty to the corporation not
to transfer that control to outsiders without first making an adequate
investigation of the facts surrounding the sale. A bill in equity was
brought by the corporation, a holding company, against certain banks
which had come into possession of large blocks of stock amounting to a
controlling interest, charging them with negligence in failing to make a
reasonable investigation of the motives and financial backing of the
prospective purchasers of their controlling interest in the company, as
a result of which the plaintiff corporation was looted of its assets by
such purchasers. The facts that the defendants were offered double
the current market value for their stock and that they had come into
possession of the stock through an earlier looting and wreckage of the
corporation, were treated as being sufficient to put them on notice that a
fraud was likely to be perpetrated. Defendants contended, however,
that this, being a mere sale of stock and an incidental passing of con-
1 35 F. Supp. 22 (1940).
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trol, they were under no duty to investigate the financial standing or the
motives of the prospective purchasers and therefore could not be held
liable for the loss to the corporation.
The ordinary rule is that a non-office holding stockholder in a cor-
poration occupies no fiduciary relation to the corporation or his fellow
stockholders, 2 and that such stockholder may dispose of his stock to
whom he will without incurring liability to the corporation.3 That the
rule is different in the case of non-office holding stockholders who own
a controlling interest is not supported by authorities, and the court in
the instant opinion admits that no case is directly in point. In the cases
cited to support the decision 4 the transferor of the controlling interest
stood in a closer relationship to the corporation than that of mere share-
holder, being either a director or manager, so that the usual fiduciary
duty was incumbent upon him by reason of his office, for breach of
which liability could attach.5 In the instant case the shareholding de-
fendant banks were corporations and, as such, could not hold office,
although they could and did control through their elected representatives
on the board of directors.6 They were, nevertheless, mere stockholders,
who, under the law ordinarily applicable to them, owed no fiduciary duty
to the corporation either in voting or in disposing of their holdings and
therefore should not be denied the privilege of freely alienating their
property rights to whomsoever they pleased.3
The duty imposed by the instant case upon owners of control of a
corporation illustrates the tendency of some courts to hold that such per-
sons stand in a fiduciary relation to minority stockholders with respect
to the assets of the corporation and therefore cannot dishonestly exercise
2 Bjorngard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483, 52 N.W. 48 (1892).
3 Roosevelt v. Hamblin, 199 Mass. 127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908); Chicago, Portage &
Superior Ry. Co. v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 163 U.S. 31, 31 S. Ct. 48, 41
L. Ed. 60 (1896).
4 Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 F. 607 (1908); Oil Shares, Inc. v.
Kahn, 94 F. (2d) 751 (1938); Oil Shares, Inc. v. Commercial Trust Co., 304 U.S.
551, 58 S. Ct. 1059, 82 L. Ed. 1522 (1938); Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E.
163, 55 L.R.A. 751 (1901).
5 In Mairs v. Madden, 30 N.E. (2d) 242 (Mass., 1940), the corporate secretary
and the corporate treasurer had acquired exclusive knowledge of an advantageous
offer of a third person to purchase stock of the corporation through holding office
as directors and with such knowledge they purchased enough shares from other
stockholders to give them a controlling interest, thus making it impossible for
the minority to accept such offer. The court held that mere ownership of stock
did not create a fiduciary relation between the minority and such corporate offi-
cials and that there was no liability for any loss to the minority.
6 To hold the shareholder responsible for the acts or omissions of the director
he elected is to treat him as a principal and his director-representative a mere
agent. Such a concept is wholly foreign to the legal relationship of stockholder
and director, though it may frequently be the case in fact.
7 Pender v. Lushington, (1877] 6 Ch. Div. 70.
8 There does not appear to have been any restriction in the by-laws limiting
the transfer of shares to persons approved by the directors. Quare, whether such
a by-law, if present, would have been valid? People ex rel. Malcolm v. Lake Sand
Corporation, 251 Ill. App. 499 (1929).
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their voting power to secure an advantage to themselves over the minor-
ity.9 However, in those cases the right involved and the duty imposed
is with respect to and directly affects the corporate assets while the duty
imposed in the principal case affects the personal right of the stock-
holder to dispose of his property to his best advantage, and only, if at
all, indirectly affects the assets of the corporation. Perhaps the position
taken in the instant case can be justified on the equitable principle that
one cannot do by indirection that which he could not do directly and
since the defendants could not loot the corporation themselves without
breaching the fiduciary duty, they could not allow it to be done through
a negligent sale of their controlling interest without also breaching such
duty.
The rule announced by this decision, if followed, would greatly re-
strict the freedom of alienation of his corporate holdings which the
shareholder has heretofore enjoyed, by placing him under the duty of
investigating his vendee's reputation and his motive for purchasing the
stock. Such a restriction imposed on the sale of controlling shares is,
however, a protection for the small investor who, in a situation as here,
would otherwise be powerless to protect his interest in the corporation
from the fraudulent acts of irresponsible directors. R. P. STUDEBAKER
COuRTs-RuLzs OF COURT AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESs-WHETHER NON-
SUIT UNDER MUNICIPAL COURT RULE Is A MATRER OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OR
OF "PRAcTxcE."-O'Brien v. McCarthy' holds that the Municipal Court of
Chicago may govern by rule of court the right of a plaintiff to take a
nonsuit because the method of taking such nonsuit bears a relation to
"practice" within the meaning of the Municipal Court Act.2 The ques-
tion arose in an action before that court to recover real estate broker's
commissions. After the evidence on both sides had been heard and be-
fore the court had made any ruling on a motion for judgment by the
defendant, the plaintiff moved for a nonsuit. The court, in the exercise
of its discretion as authorized by court rule 122,3 denied the plaintiff's
9 Bias v. Atkinson, 64 W. Va. 486, 63 S.E. 395 (1908); Chicago Hansom Cab Co.
v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 30 N.E. 667 (1892); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876).
1 306 11. App. 151, 28 N.E. (2d) 334 (1940), Matchett J., dissenting.
2 I1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 375, "That the judges of said municipal court
shall have power to adopt, in addition to or in lieu of the provisions herein con-
tained prescribing the practice in said municipal court . . . such rules regulating
the practice in said court as they may deem necessary or expedient for the proper
administration of justice in said court."
3 Civil Practice Rules of the Municipal Court of Chicago, published by the
Municipal Court of Chicago, 1933, Page 90, Rule 122 "The plaintiff may at any
time before the filing of the defendant's defense, or after the filing of such defense
before taking any other proceeding in the action, by notice in writing or in open
court, discontinue his action or any part of it, but after the filing of the pleadings
if plaintiff take any further action he Is not authorized to take a nonsuit as a
matter of right, but only in the discretion of the court." Foregoing since super-
seded as of July 1, 1940, by the text of § 52 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.
See Municipal Court Manual of the Municipal Court of Chicago, compiled by
Judge Oscar S. Caplan, Chicago, 1940, Page 30, Rule 46.
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motion and entered judgment for the defendant. Despite the plaintiff's
contention, on appeal, that the right to a nonsuit was a substantive right
given by Section 30 of the Municipal Court Act,4 hence could not be
taken away by any rule of court, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that
the Municipal Court was not limited by such provision but could, under
Section 20 of the Act, adopt the present rule "in lieu of" the provision of
the statute.
The majority of the court, in their endeavor to reach a just result on
a question which has not, in recent years, been directly before an Illi-
nois court, apparently ignored the case of Daube v. Kuppenheimer,5
which held that the plaintiff had an absolute right to take a nonsuit be-
fore the jury retired, and instead chose to base their decision mainly on
the case of Ptacek v. Coleman.6 In that case the defendant objected
to the plaintiff's motion for a nonsuit in the Municipal Court on the
ground that the plaintiff had not complied with Section 52 of the Illinois
Civil Practice Act. 7 The court there held that such section did not apply
and that Rule 122 was not superceded because made under authority
of a special law, authorized by an amendment to the constitution, hence
was not repealed by the provisions of a subsequent general law. The
actual validity of Rule 122 was not under consideration there. The min-
ority opinion in the instant case, resting primarily on Daube v. Kuppen-
heimer,8 held that the right to take a nonsuit was a substantive right
and could not be whittled away by a mere rule of court intended to
regulate procedure.
Under the early common law of England a plaintiff might enter a
voluntary nonsuit even after verdict was rendered.9 The injustice of
such rule was said to have brought modifications by act of Parliament. 0
It should be noted that this common law right was limited by statute
and not by rule of court and hence was treated as a substantive right
rather than a rule of procedure. Two early cases in Illinois" indicated
that the right to take a nonsuit was a substantial right and there was
no injustice in allowing it to be taken at any time. This position was
subsequently affirmed in Daube v. Kuppenheimer.12 Today, as the major-
ity point out in the instant case, in some jurisdictions the plaintiff's
absolute right to a nonsuit ceases at an early stage of the trial. In most
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 385, "Every person desirous of suffering a non-
suit on trial shall be barred therefrom unless he do so before the jury retire from
the bar, or before the court, in case the trial is by the court without a jury, states
its findings."
5 272 Ill. 350, 112 N.E. 61 (1916). 6 364 Ill. 618, 5 N.E. (2d) 467 (1936).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 176. 8 272 II. 350, 112 N.E. 61 (1916).
9 Keat v. Barker, 5 Mod. 208, 87 Eng. Rep. 612 (K.B. 1696).
10 Stat. 2 Hen. IV, Ch. 7 (A.D. 1400); Robinson v. Chadwick, L.R. 7 Ch. Div.
878 (1878); Stahlschmidt v. Walford, L.R. 4. Q.B. Div. 217 (1879). See also 89
A.L.R. 17.
11 Berry v. Savage, 2 Scam. 261 (1840); Howe v. Harroun, 17 In. 494 (1856).
See also Adams v. Shepard, 24 Ill. 464 (1860); Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v.
Lewis, 10 Ill. App. 191 (1881); Turnock v. Walker, 54 Ill. App. 374 (1894).
12 Note 5, supra.
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instances the right has been limited by statute, 13 although some courts
take it upon themselves to govern the right by rule, treating it as a
matter of procedure. 14 When the time designated by the statute or rule
is reached, the litigant is then deprived of any absolute right he may
have had and thereafter it is within the discretion of the court t6 grant
or deny the motion, which discretion is to be exercised with reference
to the rights of both of the parties. 15
The fundamental question before the court in this case was whether
the mode of taking a nonsuit is substance or practice. The Illinois
Supreme Court has declined to attempt to give by precise definition the
meaning of the word "practice,"' 16 but it is also clear that the legisla-
ture did not intend to give the Municipal Court power to make sub-
stantive rules of law. If we follow the decision of the Supreme Court
up to the present date17 it seems to be established that the common law
rule still prevails in Illinois, subject, of course, to such limitations as the
legislature has chosen to make. The legislature has given the owner of
a cause of action absolute control of it until the jury retire or until the
court states its findings.' 8 If we apply the doctrine laid down by our
highest court to the case under discussion, it would seem that there is no
power in the Municipal Court to make conditional this right of control,
because such right is declared to be one of substance. The dissenting
opinion points out that the difference between the rule and the statute
is deep and fundamental; that they are in sharp conflict and that the
substantive law as enacted by the legislature should govern. Just how
far the Illinois Supreme Court has gone in protecting substantive rights
having procedural aspects is illustrated by the case of Danoff v.
Larson,19 which case might well have been the basis for decision in
the instant case. In that case the Municipal Court, acting under the
same authority as here, undertook to prescribe a method by which a
defendant might be summoned to court. The court there said that the
legislature had prescribed the manner in which a summons should be
served and pointed out that power, under Section 20, did not extend so
far as to give authority to prescribe the time or manner of serving
initial process. It was further said there that it was clear that the
means by which a person was summoned into court went deeply into
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 176; Wis. Stat. 1935, § 270.24; Code of Iowa,
1935, Ch. 496, § 11562; Ark. Stat. 1937, Ch. 22, § 1485; Mich. Stat. Annot., Title 27,
§ 27.1081; Rules of Procedure for the District Court of the United States, Rule 41a
(1), made under authority of 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 723b., 723c.; see also 89 A.L.R. 50.
14 Hanson v. Casco Loan & Building Ass'n, 132 Me. 397, 171 A. 627 (1934); In
re Binney's Will, 241 Mass. 315, 135 N.E. 168 (1922); Nicolai v. Nicolai, 283 Mass.
241, 186 N.E. 240 (1933); Leonard v. Fahey, 87 N.H. 170, 175 A. 859 (1934).
15 Washburn v. Allen, 77 Me. 344 (1885); Shaw v. Boland, 81 Mass. 571, 15 Gray
571 (1860); Watts v. Watts, 179 Ark. 367, 15 S.W. (2d) 997 (1929); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of Hamilton County, 79 F. 575 (1897).
16 Danhoff v. Larson, 368 Ill. 519, 15 N.E. (2d) 290 (1938). See also Cohen v.
Bendix, 369 Ill. 507, 17 N.E. (2d) 12 (1938).
17 Notes 5 and 11, supra. 18 Note 4, supra.
19 368 Ill. 519, 15 N.E. (2d) 290 (1938).
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the substance of his rights and was more than a mere matter of form.
It would seem that a plaintiff's right to control his own suit after the
court has acquired jurisdiction is as much a part of his substantive
right as is the manner in which notice shall be given to the defendant
of a court proceeding. In contrast to this case we find the court in
Huber v. Van Schaack-Mutual, Inc.,20 holding that the Municipal Court
has power, under Section 20, to prescribe a rule charging an additional
fee for a twelve man jury trial. The charging of an additional fee was
said to relate to "practice," although a condition precedent to the exer-
cise of the right to a trial by jury. There, again, the Supreme Court
said the question was settled by Ptacek v. Coleman,21 "where we held
that the Municipal Court had the power to adopt a different rule as to
the taking of a nonsuit and this was not governed by Section 52 of the
Civil Practice Act." Certainly, the court follows no hard and fast rule
in determining what is substance and what is procedure.
22
Perhaps the most that could be said for the decision in the instant
case is that it permits the court to exercise its discretion in cases where
a perversion of justice might otherwise result. As a nonsuit is no bar
to a future action for the same cause,23 the plaintiff might withdraw his
case after the court is in possession of the means for a final determin-
ation and thus be able to harass the defendant with a new suit for the
same cause at some subsequent time. Certainly, the maxim Interest
republicae ut sit finis lituim is best served by such a decision.
R. P. SrTDEAxzR
CouRTs-TAmL AND REFERENCE-PowER OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs TO ORDER
BLOOD TESTS IN DIVORCE AcTioNs TO DETERMINE NoNPATERNrr.--Questions
concerning the effect of a rule of the Supreme Court of the United States
on prior adjudications of that court, and of the power of a federal court
to order a blood test to be taken under the Supreme Court rule which
authorizes the court to order physical examinations where physical con-
dition is in issue, were decided by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in the recent case of Beach v. Beach.' A wife brought
suit for maintenance and support of herself and an unborn child. The
20 368 Ill. 142, 13 N.E. (2d) 179 (1938).
21 Note 6, supra.
22 In the more recent case of Universal Credit Co. v. Antonsen, 374 Ill. 194.
29 N.E. (2d) 96 (1940), the Illinois Supreme Court considered the validity of rule
238h of the Municipal Court of Chicago which purported to give the plaintiff in a
replevin action the right to have the defendant punished for contempt for refusal
to give the property up to the sheriff on a writ of replevin "in addition to" his
right to proceed in trover under § 18 of the Replevin Act. In reversing the Appel-
late Court, the Supreme Court held that there was no power in the municipal
court to create by rule new substantive rights. The contempt procedure attempted
to be prescribed by such court was construed as creating a remedy in the plain-
tiff which could only be given by appropriate legislation, as such a right related
to substance rather than to "practice." The court said that rules of practice are
to administer statutes as they are and not to change them.
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 83, § 24(a).
1 114 F. (2d) 479 (1940).
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husband counterclaimed for divorce on the ground of adultery, alleging
that the child was not his. The court, on petition by the husband, order-
ed that on the birth of the child blood tests be taken of all three persons.
2
The wife refused to submit and was ordered committed for contempt.
On special appeal the circuit court affirmed the order, relying on Rule
35 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure 3 which provide: "Order for Exam-
ination. In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a
party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may
order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physi-
cian."
4
Whether the requiring of a physical examination is merely a pro-
cedural device or whether it invades a substantive right is the first ques-
tion to be considered. The United States Supreme Court's first expres-
sion on this subject came in 1891 in the case of Union Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Botsford,5 in which the court declared that subjection of a party to a
physical examination invaded his substantive rights and could not be
ordered in the absence of a statute. 6 In another leading case, Camden
& Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson,7 where a state statute authorized a court
to order physical examination, which statute was applicable in the fed-
eral courts by reason of the Conformity Act, the court held that where
a statute existed substantive rights were no longer involved. By these
decisions the court indicated that a legislative enactment was necessary
to require submission of a party to a physical examination. The ques-
tion then presented is whether a simple rule of the Supreme Court
should have the effect of a legislative enactment so as to overcome
these prior decisions.
Having no common law background, the Federal Supreme Court
possesses no inherent power to make rules. It has only a delegated
power and is subject to the limitations of that type of a grant. Never-
theless, it would seem from the procedure, requiring the proposed rules
to be submitted to Congress, that the rules are intended to have and to
possess the vitality of a statute. An analogy will be found in the procedure
2 For an analysis of the operation of the blood test and its evidentiary value,
see: Blewett Lee, "Blood Tests for Paternity," A. B. A. J., XII, 461, July, 1926;
Britt, "Blood Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of Cultural Lag," 21
Minn. L. Rev. 671; Galton, "Blood Grouping Tests and Their Relationship to the
Law," 17 Ore. L. Rev. 177; Wigmore, Evidence, Supp. 1934, §§ 165a, 165b.
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 723c.
4 The purported basis for the rule is found in 28 U.S.C.A. § 723b, which authorized
the Supreme Court to prescribe by general rules " . . . the forms of process,
writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at
law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights
of any litigant." The rules became effective at the end of the Congressional ses-
sion at which they were presented to Congress, without further legislation.
5 141 U.S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 35 L. ed. 734 (1891).
6 Since the authorizing statute for the Supreme Court rules limits the power to
prescribe rules to those relating to procedural matters, the drafters of Rule
35(a) had to adopt the attitude of tacitly reversing the court's statement in the
Botsford case.
7 177 U.S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 617, 44 L. ed. 721 (1900).
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set up by the English Judicature Act. 8 Under this act the rules com-
mittee of the Court of Appeals promulgates the rules covering practice
and procedure in civil cases. The rules are then laid before the Parlia-
ment, which, by taking no positive action against them, tacitly approves
them. It has been held that they then have the force and effect of
statutes,9 even to the point of repealing earlier inconsistent statutes. 10
In state courts in this country it is generally held that courts of record
have the rule making power, subject to constitutional and legislative
limitations, and that the effect of such rules, when promulgated, is that
of law.1 In Illinois it has been held that the Supreme Court has in-
herent power to make rules governing practice in inferior courts inde-
pendent of statutory authority. 12 However, as these powers are largely
derived from the common law, they do not bear directly on the import-
ance to be assigned to rules made by the Supreme Court of the United
States under a grant of Congress.
The real question then is whether the matter here concerned is
really one of substance or procedure. If it is the former, it cannot be
said that a rule of court, even having the effect of a statute, could
change it into one of procedure, especially in view of the fact that the
grant of rule making power extended only to procedural matters. If it
is the latter, it is validly the subject of a Supreme Court rule, but we
are left with the interesting result of the court overruling a prior de-
cision by a rule of court. That this must be the result intended is in-
dicated by the decision in the case of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc.,
13
wherein the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an order committing a
plaintiff for contempt for refusing to submit to a physical examination.
The court therein stated that the rule of the Botsford case was super-
seded by the Supreme Court rule, which had the effect of legislative en-
actment.
That a rule of court affecting procedure has the effect of legislative
enactment may be conceded, but whether a rule for the making of
which there exists no authority has the effect of statute is another mat-
ter. Here there was authority only if there is no substantive right to
freedom from physical examination. That there should be no such priv-
ilege or right is clearly demonstrated by Professor Wigmore in his work
on Evidence. 14 As a result, physical examination being a procedural
s Judicature Act, 1925, 1 98 (p. 2438 Annual Practice 1940).
9 Smythe v. Wiles, 2 K.B. 66 (1921).
10 Lewin v. Trimming, Trimming v. Lewin and Chadwick & Sons, 21 Q.B.D. 230
(1888).
11 Gyure v. Sloan Valve Co., 367 11. 489, 11 N.E. (2d) 963 (1937); Wilson v. Gill,
279 Ill. App. 487 (1935); People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
12 People v. Cowdrey, 360 Ill. 633, 196 N.E. 838 (1935), reversing and remanding
278 Ill. App. 65; as in 290 Ill. App. 605, 8 N.E. (2d) 714 (1937). See also In. Rev.
Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.28 (Supreme Court Rule 28).
13 108 Fed. (2d) 415 (1939), certiorari granted, 309 U.S. 650, 60 S. Ct. 809, 84 L.
ed. 1001 (1940).
14 §§ 165a, 165b, "Testimonial Privilege-Corporal Exhibition," in which he
points out that the common law duty to bear witness to the truth includes the
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matter, the subject comes properly within the rule making power of the
court.
What is apt to be one of the most far-reaching results of this de-
cision is that it inferentially indicates that the courts of the several
states, having inherent power to make rules governing procedural mat-
ters, could require the making of physical examinations even in absence
of statute. Some states have refused to order physical examinations or
blood tests in absence of statute, indicating that to do so would be in-
vasion of a privilege or substantive right.15 That the Federal Supreme
Court is merely joining the majority, however, is indicated by the numer-
ous decisions which have held that a state court has inherent power to
order physical examinations.' 6 These courts find their authority in the
old writs, in statutes doing away with privilege as to testimony, and in
the absence of privilege at common law as to corporal exhibition.
17
In addition to broadening the base of legal authority for requiring
physical examinations, the court in the case at hand has also definitely
brought the blood test within the meaning of ordinary physical examina-
tion statutes, and by bringing the infant within the meaning of the term,
"parties to the suit," the court has extended the effective use of the
blood test as a method of determining non-paternity to the broad civil
field of divorce and allied actions. Few cases to date have taken the
blood test into the field of civil law, especially into actions for divorce,
although there is much English authority for the use of the physical
examination in such actions, many of them arising in suits for divorce
on the ground of impotency, 8 and physical examination has been em-
ployed in similar actions in this country.19 Few cases are reported,
duty to exhibit the body and that the civil opponent's privilege as to documents
and oral testimony was not extended by the common law to corporal exhibition.
He sets out the following cases in which corporal exhibition was required: (1)
writ de ventre inspiciendo, (2) appeal of mayhem, (3) bill for divorce alleging
impotency, (4) restraint for insanity, (5) for identification, (6) for corporal
injuries.
15 Howland v. Beck, 56 F. (2d) 35 (1932); Beuschel v. Manowitz, 241 App. Div.
888, 272 N.Y.S. 165 (1934), leave to appeal denied, 265 N.Y. 509, 193 N.E. 295
(1934); Commonwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. Dist. & Co. 111 (1934). All of these states
now have statutes authorizing the court to require blood tests.
16 Physical Examinations: Cook v. Miller, 103 Conn., 267, 130 A. 571 (1925);
Atkin-son v. United Rys. Co., 286 Mo. 634, 228 S.W. 483 (1921); O'Brien v. Sullivan,
107 Neb. 512, 186 N.W. 532 (1922); Louisiana & A.R. Co. v. Woodson, 127 Ark. 323,
192 S.W. 174 (1917). Blood Tests: State, ex rel Verda Van Camp, v. Welling, 6 Ohio
0. 371 (1936); State v. Damm. 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933), where the motion by
the defendant was denied but the power of the court to order it was affirmed on
rehearing, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936).
17 Many states have found it necessary to adopt statutes authorizing the taking
of physical examinations, and New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, New Jer-
sey, Louisiana, Montana, Wisconsin, and California now have laws authorizing
and regulating the taking of blood tests. Some states did so as much for the pur-
pose of giving probative value to this kind of evidence as for the purpose of
enabling the courts to exercise the power.
Is Countess of Essex' Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 785 (1738).
19 Le Barron v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365 (1862); Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige
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however, in which blood tests have been ordered in divorce actions. In
the case of McDonald v. McDonald,20 a motion for a blood test under
the statute was denied where a specific act of adultery was charged by
a husband in a divorce suit, where legitimacy was in issue, on the ground
that in view of the presumption of legitimacy insufficient foundation had
been laid. Even a novice in the field of genetics will question the wisdom
of this holding. In the case of Model v. Modell,21 heard in Illinois where
no statute exists, the same question was in issue. The wife refused to
submit to a blood test, but no order was entered on the husband's peti-
tion for the test, the case being heard under stipulation as a default
matter with the decree finding that the child was born of the union.
The case of Beach v. Beach should be remembered as a big advance
toward a more enlightened judicial view of one of the newer types of
scientific evidence. The decision has placed the power to order a physi-
cal examination in the sphere of procedure where it would seem to be
limited only by judicial and not legislative restraints. It has further made
the blood test an incident of a physical examination, bringing it within
the terms of existing statutes in some states. And it has ratified the use
of the blood test in the new field of divorce actions, furnishing import-
ant authority for that use. D. G. MAcDOAID
HUSBAND AND WI---ToRTs-WHETHER HUSBAND Is LIABLE FOR TORT OF
WIFm COMMrrrED WHILE oi FAMILy ERuRAND.-A married woman, accom-
panied by her minor daughter, drove her husband's car downtown to
purchase a dress for the child. While en route she collided with the car
of the plaintiff. In the subsequent action, the plaintiff joined the husband
and wife as defendants and obtained judgment against them. The hus-
band alone appealed to the circuit court, which likewise entered judgment
for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Appellate Court, in the cause entitled
O'Haran v. Leiner,1 the husband, conceding his wife's negligence, denied
that he was in possession and control of the automobile at the time of
the accident, and denied further that his wife was acting at the time
under any express or implied authority from him. These contentions
failed, and the plaintiff's judgment was affirmed. The controlling ele-
ment, concluded the Appellate Court, was the family errand for which
the car was being used, creating between the defendant and his wife the
legal relationship of principal and agent. Such relationship was deemed
to exist because, had the wife purchased the dress for the child, the de-
fendant would have been liable for the price thereof under the Illinois
Family Expense Statute.2 This conclusion rested on an analogy drawn
554 (N.Y., 1836); Newell v. Newell, 9 Paige 25 (N.Y., 1841); Bolmer v. Edsall,
90 N.J. Eq. 299, 106 A. 646 (1919).
20 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 1936, p. 907, affmd., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7, 1936, p. 1572. See
37 Col. L. Rev. 156, 158.
21 No. 430849, Sup. Ct. of Cook County, 1925-6.
1 306 Ill. App. 230, 28 N.E. (2d) 315 (1940).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 68, § 15.
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from the earlier Illinois case of Graham v. Page,s wherein a father was
held liable for an injury to the plaintiff, caused by the negligent operation
of the father's car by the latter's minor daughter while returning from
the cobbler's with a pair of her shoes which had been previously left
there for repairs. The court based its decision on the proposition that the
daughter was acting as her father's agent, inasmuch as it was the duty
of the father to provide his daughter with the necessary shoes and to
keep them in repair.
The result attained in the O'Haran case closely approximates a re-
sult obtainable under an application of the so-called "family purpose" or
"family car" doctrine. This precept is most simply stated as follows:
The head of a family who purchases an automobile for the general use,
pleasure, or convenience of his family is liable for injury to persons or
property caused by the negligent operation of such automobile while under
the control of any member of his family for any of the aforesaid pur-
poses. 4 The courts, in applying this doctrine, recognize that the liability
of the owner cannot flow from the mere relation of husband and. wife 5
or parent and child,6 but that such liability must be founded on the re-
lation of principal and agent, and so resort to an extension of the doctrine
of respondeat superior and consider the family as a "business" subject
to the direction, control, and maintenance of the father. The courts find
little difficulty in interpreting a general permission to members of the
family to drive the family car as a general authority to further the pur-
poses and functions of the family. The application of the doctrine nec-
essarily excludes those cases in which the owner of the car accompanies
the driver or expressly authorizes the use of the car in some recognized
business, or in which the owner intrusts the vehicle to an incompetent or
reckless operator, or where the operation of the car occurs in spite of
directions to the contrary.
3 300 Ill. 40, 132 N.E. 817 (1921).
4 Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 P. 1020, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 59 (1913),
re-examined and approved in Allison v. Bartelt, 121 Wash. 418, 209 P. 863 (1922).
The cases accepting, rejecting, or modifying the doctrine are collected in 64
A. L. R. 844, 88 A. L. R. 601 and 100 A. L. R. 1021, superseding numerous earlier
annotations. The underlying considerations of policy responsible for the doctrine
are perhaps obvious. Although it has been judicially determined that an automo-
bile is not a dangerous instrumentality, it is difficult to exclude altogether the
psychological response to daily statistics to the contrary. Added to this is the
growing appreciation of absolute owner-liability, which in most instances can be
adequately covered by insurance. In a number of states (e.g., Michigan, Idaho,
Connecticut), statutory provisions declare the owner liable in any instance for
injuries arising from the negligent operation of a vehicle which he has expressly
or impliedly permitted another to use, regardless of the relation between the
lender and borrower. No similar statutory provisions exist in Illinois.
5 "For all civil injuries committed by a married woman, damages may be
recovered from her alone, and her husband shall not be responsible therefor,
except in cases where he would be jointly responsible with her, if the marriage
did not exist." Ill. Rev. Stat., 1939, ch. 68, § 4. This statute is typical of those
enacted in almost all states, and removes the common-law rule by which a hus-
band was absolutely liable for his wife's torts. Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872).
6 Reynolds v. Ferree, 86 Ill. 570 (1877).
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"The doctrine known as the 'family purpose' doctrine . . . is not the
law in Illinois. ' 7 This statement, in substance, was repeated in the
O'Haran case but, as has been seen, the opinion in that case seeks to
support its decision on a basis different from that on which the usual
"family purpose" decisions are founded. There is thus presented the
question of the distinction, if any, between "family purpose" and "family
errand," and the further question as to whether there exists in the
O'Haran case an agency relation sufficient to sustain the liability of the
defendant for his wife's tort.
The Illinois law on this subject dates back to the case of Arkin v.
Page,8 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1919. In that case the
existing law of other states was reviewed and rejected, although without
an express commitment against the "family purpose" doctrine by name.
Justice Dunn, writing the opinion, stated rather tersely: "This argument
[owner-liability under the "family purpose" doctrine] may be sound
enough, but it has no application to the doctrine of master and servant."
The opinion in the Graham case, the facts of which appear above, ap-
proved and apparently adopted the conclusions of a Tennessee court
which had earlier submitted to the doctrine under discussion.9 Four
years later, in Gates v. Mader10 the Supreme Court sustained a re-
covery by the plaintiff for injuries resulting from the negligent operation
of the defendant's car by the defendant's son who was driving his mother
and sisters to a luncheon engagement. The fact that the son was not a
minor, and that he did not reside at home were held to be immaterial.
The impression left by this decision, following as it did on the heels
of the Graham case, was that Arkin v. Page was no longer law in Illi-
nois, and that a successful application of the "family purpose" doctrine
in this state was a mere matter of locating, in any future case, an
operative element capable of bearing the label "family errand."'" Sub-
7 Andersen v. Byrnes, 344 Ill. 240, 245, 176 N. E. 374 (1931).
8 287 Ill. 420, 123 N. E. 30 (1919). An earlier, though perhaps less important case
is that of Smith v. Tappen, 208 Il1. App. 433 (1917), suggesting approval of the
"family purpose" doctrine. However, the Supreme Court, in the Arkin case, ig-
nored, intentionally or otherwise, this earlier case.
9 Graham v. Page, note 3, supra, at p. 44. "The weight of authority supports
the liability of the owner of a car which is kept for family use and pleasure
where an injury is negligently caused by it while driven by one of his children
by his permission, and the reasoning of those cases seems sound and more in
harmony with the principles of justice. We agree with the Supreme Court of
Tennessee that where a father provides his family with an automobile for their
pleasure, comfort and entertainment, 'the dictates of natural justice should re-
quire that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation, because
only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial justice be attained.' (King v.
Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217.)."
10 316 Ill. 313, 147 N.E. 241 (1925). Justice Dunn, who wrote the Arkin opinion,
and Justices Thompson and De Young, dissented.
11 "And the court there (in Graham v. Page] expressly approved the rule
announced by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, which case the court has (sic]
refused to follow in the Arkin case." Cloyes v. Plaatje, 231 Ill. App. 183 (1923).
"We think the language used [in the Graham case] is not susceptible of any con-
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sequently, in White v. Seitz,12 the Appellate Court affirmed a judgment
for a plaintiff for injuries sustained while riding as a guest with defend-
ant's minor son in the family car. The defendant appealed, and affirm-
ance seemed inevitable upon a simple application of the doctrine of
stare decisis, especially in view of the pregnant language in the Graham
case.'8 The judgment was reversed, 14 however, and the Arkin case re-
inforced. 15 To dispel any further doubts, the "family purpose" doctrine
was expressly rejected shortly thereafter in Andersen v. Byrnes.16
The foregoing indicates generally the principles of law governing the
liability of an Illinois automobile owner for the negligence of family-
member drivers. It is not intended to suggest that Graham v. Page has
been even impliedly overruled, although it must be conceded that the
decision has been deprived of its original vitality and has therefore lost
its capacity for extension, by analogy or otherwise, to cases of the type
presented in O'Haran v. Leiner.
There remains for consideration, then, the only other ground upon
which the decision in the case was thought to be justified: viz., the
principal and agent relationship said to arise between husband and wife
when either acts in a situation where the Family Expense Statute 17 might
apply. This statute altered the common-law rule by which the husband
alone was charged with the cost of necessaries for his wife and children
and under which there was created an "implied-in-law authority"' s by
struction other than a clear expression of intention that the Arkin case, supra,
would not be followed in the future." Toms v. Ketterer, 237 Ill. App. 135 (1925).
In Williams v. Stearns, 256 Ill. App. 425 (1930), the defendant had relied upon
an earlier case decided by this same court. In answer, the court said, "While
that case was decided in accordance with what we then understood to be the law
... yet it is out of harmony with the law at the present time."
12 258 Ill. App. 318 (1930). 13 Graham v. Page, note 3, supra.
14 342 Ill. 266, 174 N.E. 371 (1930).
15 Ibid., at 273: "There is a conflict among the decisions . . .The arguments
have been stated, the conclusion heretofore announced by this court is clear, and
no new reason appears which should induce a change of view. . . .There is a
greater volume of decided cases than when the Arkin case was decided but the
conflict of opinion is no less. We considered in that case all the arguments pre-
sented and we have reconsidered them in the light of the cases since decided.
We adhere to the views there expressed ...... Justice Dunn wrote the majority
opinion in the Arkin case.
16 344 Ill. 240, 176 N.E. 374 (1931).
17 "The expenses of the family and of the education of the children shall be
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or of either of them, in
favor of creditors therefor, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
separately." Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 68, § 15.
IS The expression "implied-in-law authority" is here used guardedly and only
as a matter of convenience. It is clear that no real authority or agency exists in
the strict sense. The continued use of the phrase by courts and writers as de-
scriptive of the ground of a husband's or father's liability for necessaries pur-
chased by the wife or child, has apparently led some courts to ignore the funda-
mentals of the doctrine of principal and agent, and to respond to the underlying
fallacy by such extensions as found in Graham v. Page (supra, note 3). And
therein lies one obstacle to the attempted analogy in the instant case.
However, the question of agency is relatively immaterial under the "Family Ex-
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virtue of which the wife or children could pledge his credit for such
necessaries. 19 This implied authority was limited, and could have no
scope greater than that dictated by a particular exigency. Family ex-
penses and necessaries are not synonomous;20 and, since the husband
and wife are jointly and severally liable for the purchase of family items
under the statute, such expenses may be incurred by either spouse in
his or her own right without the sanction or authority of the other.21 On
this basis, a shopping tour by the wife, since it can legally result in in-
dividual liability for the purchases made, is as much an individual as a
family errand. And such has been intimated in at least one jurisdiction
where a wife, while so occupied, caused injury with her husband's car.
22
It is clear, in the instant case, that the defendant had not expressly
authorized the purchase of the dress for the child. He had no knowl-
edge of his wife's intention in that respect, for the request for the dress
was not made by the child until the afternoon of the accident, at which
time defendant was absent from home. The defendant was not, therefore,
called upon, by the request of his wife or by operation of law, to authorize
or permit the use of his car for the particular purpose. The dress was
but a whim of the child; it was not a necessary. It does not appear that
the dress was ever worn by the child, or, as a matter of fact, that it
was ever actually purchased. 23 It cannot be seriously contended that the
minor daughter could constitute her mother the agent of her father.
pense" Statute. In Gaffield v. Scott, 40 Ill. App. 380 (1890), it was said: "The old
law, as to the agency of the wife binding the husband in ordinary domestic matters
• . . has become unimportant by the statute making both husband and wife
responsible for family expenses. § 15, Chap. 68, R.S." Yet, it is undoubtedly true
that a creditor can recover from a husband or father on the theory that neces-
saries have been supplied. The important point is that whatever "authority" is
deemed to exist is limited, by the common law, to a pledging of credit.
19 Gaffield v. Scott, supra, note 18.
20 Mandel Bros. v. Ringstrom, 189 Ill. App. 564 (1914).
21 Northwestern Military & Naval Academy v. Wadleigh, 267 Inl. App. 1 (1932).
22 In Novak v. Zastrow, 200 Wis. 394, 228 N. W. 473 (1930), the court found that
no agency relation existed between a husband and his wife in the mere operation
of the husband's automobile by the wife for the purpose of bringing her mother
to their home for a visit. On the argument, plaintifft's counsel insisted that the
requisite relationship was established by virtue of the fact that the wife did some
shopping en route. This fact was not proved, but the court considered it: "Grant-
ing that the shopping was for the necessaries of the wife, granting that the hus-
band is liable to pay therefor, and granting that she had authority to pledge his
credit-that does not mean that, while the wife is doing her own shopping, she is
acting as her husband's agent. To say that it is the business of the husband to
select his wife's gowns and bonnets, and that it is her duty to wear apparel of his
choosing, is to suggest a bondage which the temerity of man has not suggested
and to which the spirit of woman has not submitted within the memory of the
living. Such thralldom has not had practical existence in modern time, if it were
ever painted in legal fiction."
23 In order that an item purchased constitute a family expense within the mean-
ing of the statute, it must be used in the family. Robertson v. Warden, 197 Ill.
App. 478 (1916); Whitney, Inc. v. Mandel, 218 Ill. App. 316 (1920); Blackstone Shop
v. Ashman, 250 Ill. App. 401 (1928). See also Northwestern Military & Naval
Academy v. Wadleigh, supra, note 21.
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Hence, there was no relationship of principal and agent existing between
the defendant and his wife at the time of and in respect to the particu-
lar transaction out of which the tort arose.24 The decision in the case
plainly requires the support of the "family purpose" doctrine. That this
doctrine is not law in Illinois is admitted in the opinion.25 Since neither
ground for the decision is valid, the case must rest without apparent
foundation. H. M. KNOTH
SALEs-DELIVERY AND ACCETANCE OF GooDs-EmECT OF PARTAL DELIVERY
AND ACCEPTANCE AS TO RIGHT To REJECT SUBSEQUENT DELrvmsI.-In the case
of Interstate Grocer Company v. Colorado Milling and Elevator Com-
pany,1 the defendant entered into a written contract to purchase from
the plaintiff 420 barrels of flour of specified grade in two equal carload
shipments, the contract containing a warranty of quality. The buyer
expressly waived any claim or defense based on quality unless notice
of defects was sent to seller in a specified manner and within a speci-
fied time. Liquidated damages were provided for failure to order out
the requisite shipments and the contract contained the following clause:
". .. this contract shall be construed to be severable as to each install-
ment . . . and breach or default of either buyer or seller as to any
installment or installments shall not give the other party a right to cancel
this contract. .. ."
The first carload was shipped and paid for on delivery in accordance
with the terms of the contract but the defendant failed to order out the
second shipment and did not give the requisite notice of defects in the
first shipment. Eight months after the expiration of the original time
for performance, the defendant advised that it would not order out the
second carload and claimed defects in the previous shipment. The plain-
tiff denied the existence of any defects and brought suit for liquidated
damages for the failure to complete the contract. The defendant denied
liability for failure to order out the second shipment on the ground that
the first shipment was defective in quality, and sought, by means of
cross-complaint, to recover damages for such defective shipment.
The court was unanimous in refusing to allow the cross-complaint,
holding that any defects which existed had been waived by failure to
perform the contractual conditions precedent to recovery therefor -
namely, the giving of notice of defects within the time and in the manner
prescribed by contract. The issue then remains: Is the defendant pur-
chaser liable for failure to order out the second car?
With regard thereto it is claimed that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to permit the defendant to go to the jury with the evidence pre-
sented as to the quality of the first shipment, contending that, inasmuch
as the seller contended this shipment did comply with the contractual
24 See Mosby v. Kimball, 345 Ill. 420, 178 N. E. 66 (1931), and Johanson v. Johns-
ton Printing Co., 263 Ila. 236, 104 N. E. 1046 (1914).
25 306 Ill. App. 230, at 232, 28 N. E. (2d) 315, at 317 (1940).
1 199 Ark. 645, 135 S. W. (2d) 661 (1940).
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requirements, it evidenced an intent to ship the same goods, and if in
fact the shipment was defective, the purchaser should not be forced to
order out a second defective shipment and then be relegated to an action
for breach of warranty. While a strong dissent so holds, the majority
of the court affirms the ruling of the trial judge on this matter. It is
this divergence of opinion within the court which presents the ultimate
problem of the decision-and much can be said for each holding. Indeed,
it seems questionable if the result would have been the same had the
defendant been somewhat less dilatory in its actions. And if the instant
case is to be considered as authority on the problem, it is entirely
possible that this authority will be short-lived if a case presenting the
problem in connection with a more kindly factual situation should arise.
The majority of the court rather summarily dismisses the question
of going to the jury with the evidence which the defendant presented of
the defective quality of the initial shipment on the ground that the con-
tractual provision governs the matter in that it provides, first, that the
contract is to be severable as to each installment and breach of one
installment shall not give the other party a right to cancel the contract,
and, second, that failure to give proper notice of defects waived such
defects as a basis of claim or defense. While this is all very true, one
must query whether the first clause actually has the unequivocal mean-
ing ascribed to it by the court, and, as to the second clause, whether
the defective quality of the initial shipment is in fact being used as a
ground of defense by the purchaser.
What is the meaning of the language that "breach or default of
either buyer or seller as to any installment or installments shall not give
the other party a right to cancel this contract. . ."? Does it mean that no
breach can be treated as total so as to entitle the innocent party to
refuse to perform further under the contract? Or does it mean merely
that no breach by deviation from exact performance of one installment
shall be treated as a breach of the whole contract? It seems that the
latter explanation would be more logical, and the result would then be
that failure to perform exactly as to the first installment would not of
itself be sufficient cause to cancel the contract. But acceptance of one
defective installment would not bind the purchaser to accept defective
performance of succeeding installments. Numerous authorities may be
found advancing the proposition that, in an installment contract, the
fact of one defective installment does not give any right to refuse sub-
sequent installments which are not defective.2 But equally numerous
are the authorities holding that, in the same situation, there is no duty
to order out other defective installments.3 Thus it may well be said in
2 H. H. King Flour Mills Co. v. Bay City Baking Co., 240 Mich. 79, 214 N. W. 973
(1927); Yerxa, Andrews & Thurston, Inc., v. Randazzo Macaroni Mfg. Co., 315
Mo. 927, 288 S. W. 20 (1926).
3 C. A. Wooten & Co. v. Bain-Adams Co., 146 Ark. 462, 226 S. W. 134, 136 (1920);
Nye & Nisson v. Weed Lumber Co., 92 Cal. App. 598, 268 P. 659 (1928); 29 A. L. R.
1517, note, 1521, 1522. For an interesting analysis of this problem, see 38 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 539.
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this case that the purchaser desires to cancel the contract for defects
in future installments rather than in past installments.
Of course, it cannot be denied that the purchaser, by failing to
object to the quality of the initial shipment within the specified time,
has waived such defect as a ground of claim or defense. The contract
expressly so provides. And authorities support this result. 4 But when
evidence of the defective shipment is presented to show the seller's
avowed understanding of his duties under the contract and as merely a
factor indicating an intent to make similar future performance, it may
well be said that it is not being used as a defense. By way of example,
let us consider a very clear case of anticipatory breach. Let us assume
that after an initial installment has been delivered, defective in quality,
the seller states, "That is the merchandise ordered and that is exactly
what I am going to ship." Assuming the same contractual provision as
exists in the principal case, would the purchaser be unable to show what
was shipped in the first instance to justify a refusal to continue under
the contract? Clearly not, even though he was making no claim for
damages. 5
This example does not differ materially from the principal case,
save that the factual situation in the hypothetical case presents a more
apparent issue. For in the case under discussion there was no such
clearly avowed intent on the part of the seller. Instead it would have
to be shown inferrentially from the quality of the shipment already made
and the seller's avowal that no defects existed. To permit this to go to
the jury would be no great hardship on the seller. If in fact he would
ship only defective goods, he has no right to recovery. And if the initial
shipment or the material the seller had available to ship were of the
contractual quality, he could readily overcome the purchaser's case by
evidence thereof. At any rate, while we might question whether the ex-
press stand of the seller that the prior shipment was of good quality
would be such evidence of intent to ship goods of similar quality in the
future as would justify the purchaser's refusal to order out subsequent
installments, that problem was not raised in the decision.
The majority opinion places much emphasis upon the Yerxa case
heretofore cited. 6 And it must be admitted that that case does correctly
state the effect of the pertinent clauses of this contract and of accept-
ance of prior installments. But it must be noted that no issue was there
raised as to the quality of the shipments to be subsequently made. The
case most nearly in point is one which was not cited in the principal
4 In the case of Yerxa, Andrews & Thurston, Inc. v. Randazzo Macaroni lVIfg.
Co., 315 Mo. 927, 288 S. W. 20, 37 (1926), the court states, "It has been repeatedly
ruled that similar contractual obligations are conditions precedent to be observed
and performed by the buyer, and he must show a compliance therewith on his
part, or a waiver thereof by the seller, before he can recover damages from the
seller upon a warranty, express or implied, as to the quality or fitness of the
goods delivered by seller."
5 See 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 539, 541-4, and cases therein cited.
6 Notes 2 and 4, supra.
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case and which, curiously enough, arose some fourteen years previous in
the same jurisdiction, 7 but which contained no clause as to severability
of the installments as exists in the instant case. The result there reached
was virtually identical with that reached in the principal case, even to
the extent of a similar dissenting opinion. However, in that earlier case,
the court stated that the evidence was kept from the jury because "-
the testimony does not warrant an inference that appellee's attitude was
one of refusal to comply with the requirements of the contract with re-
spect to future shipments." 8 It is highly possible that the court in the
principal case might have found that the evidence adduced would war-
rant such an inference and it is in its failure to consider this issue that
the weakness of the instant decision lies. M. J. SCHRAM
SALES - MAKING AND R uirsrrms OF EXPRESS WARRANTY - WHETHER
DISPLAYING MANUFAcTURER'S LABEL ATTACHED TO GOODS mN SEALED CONTAINER
Is EXPRESS WARRANTY BY DEALER.- Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Company,
involved an action against a retailer for the breach of an express war-
ranty that mascara, sold to the plaintiff under a trade name, was harm-
less and runproof. The plaintiff testified that she entered a Woolworth
store, picked up a card, attached to which was a tube containing the type
of mascara she had been using for several years, handed the sales girl
a dime, and said to the girl, "This mascara is safe isn't it?" The clerk
replied, "It's on the tube - it says harmless." The card furnished by
the manufacturer contained the words "Runproof" and "Harmless." In
applying the mascara to her eyelashes some of it fell into her eye causing
the eye to itch and eventually causing the loss of sight in that eye.
The plaintiff abandoned any claim on the theory of an implied war-
ranty and based her claim solely on the theory of an express war-
ranty. The trial court permitted the jury to find a verdict for the
plaintiff and entered judgment thereon. On appeal the decision was
affirmed, with one judge dissenting. The majority gave no considera-
tion to the defense that the warranty was made after the sale and
therefore constituted no part of the inducement.
2
It has long been settled in this state that there are four essential
elements to an express warranty. There must be (1) an affirmation as
to the quality or condition of the thing sold (2) made by the seller
at the time of the sale (3) for the purpose of inducing the buyer to make
the purchase, and (4) it must be relied upon by the buyer in making
the purchase.3 It is not necessary that the word "warrant" or any
7 Westbrook v. Mente & Co., Inc., 170 Ark. 1131, 282 S. W. 961 (1926).
8 Ibid at p. 962.
1 306 Ill. App. 384, 28 N.E. (2d) 804 (1940).
2 Anderson v. Eastman, 168 Ill. App. 172 (1912). If a complete contract of sale
is made, with or without warranty, then any subsequent representations, made
after the property is delivered and accepted but before the last of the money is
paid, do not constitute a warranty where there is no new or additional considera-
tion.
3 Hawkins v. Berry, 5 Gilm. 36 (1848); Ender v. Scott, 11 Ill. 35 (1849); Thorne
v. McVeagh, 75 Ill. 81 (1874); Robinson v. Harvey, 82 Ill. 58 (1876).
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other particular words be used. 4 The essential elements of an express
warranty as stated above are now embodied in the sales act.5
The plaintiff contended and the court held that a retailer, by merely
displaying on his counter cards furnished by a manufacturer, upon
which are fastened sealed tubes of mascara, and which contain the
words "Runproof-Harmless," adopts as his own the statements con-
tained on the card, assumes the responsiblity, and expressly warrants
that the product is harmless. 6
The Sales Act states: "In the case of a contract to sell or a sale
of a specified article under its patent or trade name, there is no implied
warranty as to its fitness of any particular purpose."' 7 This has fre-
quently been read as though the word "particular" were not present,
that is, as though it said that there is no implied warranty of fitness
for any purpose, s and apparently counsel in this case conceded that
there was no implied warranty; hence the claim was grounded on the
theory of an express warranty.
It is true, as pointed out by the court, that where the contract is
oral, it is the province of the jury to decide whether or not what was
said was a warranty. But before the jury is allowed to decide, it should
be given the proper instructions as to the ingredients of an express
warranty. While the jury might have found that the sales girl's state-
4 Whether or not a warranty has been made has been said to be a matter of
intention; Wheeler v. Reed, 36 Ill. 81 (1864); Adams v. Johnson, 15 InI. 345 (1854);
Hanson v. Busse, 45 Ill. 496 (1867), but this may not now be true.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 121 , § 12.
6 At this point in the discussion it is interesting to compare with the instant
case, the recent case of Bel v. Adler, 11 S.E. (2d) 495 (Ga., 1940). A customer of
a department store purchased a jar of cold cream in its original unbroken pack-
age, after being assured by the clerk that the store was recommending this
cream to its customers, that it was wonderful, pure, beneficial, harmless, and
that it would not harm the most tender skin. The court held that these state-
ments were not sufficient to show an "express warranty" and amounted to no
more than a recommendation of the cold cream, and further that a dealer does
not impliedly warrant than an article in a perfect appearing original package,
manufactured by a reputable manufacturer and in practical use in the retail
trade so as not to be examinable for imperfections, is suitable for the purposes
intended, and the only warranty by the dealer is that the goods are manufactured
by a reputable manufacturer.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 121 , § 15 (4).
8 See Santa Rosa-Vallejo Tanning Co. v. C. Kronauer & Co., 228 Inl. App. 236
(1923), and Niegenfind v. Singer, 227 Inl. App. 493 (1923). In Fuchs & Lang Co. v.
Kittredge & Co., 242 Ill. 88, 89 N.E. 723 (1909), the court held that an implied war-
ranty of merchantable quality existed although the article was sold under its trade
name, but the court was not required to, and did not, give to the expression "mer-
chantable quality" the meaning of fitness for the general purpose for which it
was designed by the seller. Usually § 15 (4) is treated as a qualification of § 15 (1)
only, so that a recovery may nevertheless be warranted under § 15 (2). Giant Mfg.
Co. v. Yates American Machine Co., 111 F. (2d) 360 (1940); Kaull v. Blacker,
107 Kan. 578, 193 P. 182 (1920); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y.
388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931). And see note In 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 281 (1931), and com-
ments on the Ryan case in 26 Ill. L. Rev. 594 (1932). Sec. 1 Williston, Sales,
1 236 a n. 63.
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ment, "It is on the tube - it says harmless," constituted an express
warranty, the court in its language seems to assume that the warranty
grew out of the seller's permitting the sale of the article with the repre-
sentation on the container and on the card to which the container was
attached. This language might establish an unfortunate precedent in
cases when, like this, the words do not purport to be the words of the
vendor but the words of the manufacturer. Furthermore, it is not clear
that the jury were instructed to find evidence of an adoption by the
seller of the manufacturer's representation beyond the mere fact of
selling the article with that statement on it.
It is conceivable that a situation might arise where cards or stream-
ers, furnished by the manufacturer for advertising purposes, but not
containing the manufacturer's name, displayed by the retailer, could
be construed as an express warranty if the statements contained thereon
were relied on by the buyer and induced the sale. However, such facts
are not present in the instant case, and it has been held that the act
of displaying to a prospective buyer a circular letter of a manufacturer,
which the buyer knows to be that of the manufacturer, does not consti-
tute a warranty by the dealer 9 unless he expressly adopts it as his own.10
If it is the law of Illinois that there is no implied warranty of any
kind where an article is sold under its patent or trade name, the court
here seems to find a means of escaping that interpretation by finding
an express warranty where most courts would have found only an im-
plied one. J. R. SCOTT
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - WITNESSES AND PERSONS COMPELLED TO PRO-
DUCE EVIDENCE - RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR OF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS IN THE ABSENCE OF REASON-
ABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE AN EMPLOYER IS VIOLATING THE PROVISIONS OF THE
ACT. - The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the United
States Department of Labor, acting pursuant to the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,1 undertook an investigation of the
acts and practices of a general merchandising corporation with regard
to wages and hours and classification of employees engaged in inter-
state commerce. 2 In the course of the investigation, the Administrator
issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring the corporation to furnish for
inspection the employees' wage and hour records covering a period of
six months. Upon refusal of the corporation to comply, the Adminis-
trator obtained an enforcement order from the Federal District Court.
9 Cool v. Fighter, 239 Mich. 42, 214 N.W. 162 (1927); Pemberton v. Dean, 88
Minn. 60, 92 N.W. 478 (1902).
10 Morris v. Trinkle, 91 Ind. App. 657, 170 N.E. 101 (1930).
1 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219.
2 Section 2 of the Act sets out a legislative finding and declaration of policy
which constitutes the legislative justification of the Act as a regulation of inter-
state commerce.
3 Andrews v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 30 F. Supp. 380 (1939). The procedure
of the Administrator in securing the enforcement order is that usually followed in
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The respondent appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, insisting that
the requirements of the subpoena were unreasonable and as such con-
stituted an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution,4 on the grounds that no specific in-
vestigation on complaint was pending, and that the Administrator had
made no showing in the District Court of probable cause to suspect
violations of the Act, pointing out that no previous case had upheld a
search and seizure in the absence of probable cause except when di-
rected against a public utility or the like. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the order.5
The case presents again the ever recurring problem of the investiga-
tory power of an administrative agency in the course of a purely ad-
ministrative function.6 Controversies of this type date as far back as
like cases, and for the purpose of the present Act, Section 9 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 49, has been adopted as Section 9. This section pro-
vides in part: "And in case of disobedience to a subpoena the commission may
invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence." Such autho-
rization is required in view of the settled rule that an administrative agency has
no power of its own in this respect. See Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047 (1894).
4 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
The concept of unreasonable searches and seizures in the United States was born
of the deep resentment against the familiar general writs of assistance used by
officials of the Crown to detect violations of smuggling laws. Fraenkel, Concern-
ing Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361. In Boyd v. United States,
116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886), a subpoena duces tecum was held
to fall into the class of unreasonable searches and seizures under certain cir-
cumstances where the object of its use was to compel the production of docu-
ments by a person to be used against that person in a criminal proceeding. See
also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906). Although a
corporation is not protected against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment (Hale v. Henkel, supra), it is settled that like a natural person a corpora-
tion may invoke the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1920). As to natural
persons, statutory provisions granting immunity against the use of evidence pro-
duced removes the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment. Brown v. Walker, 161
U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896).
5 Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F. (2d) 384 (1940).
6 That an administrative commission acting in a quasi-judicial capacity has the
power to resort to the use of subpoenas for the purpose of testimonial compulsion
and the production of documents is well settled. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047 (1894); Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 S. Ct. 563, 48 L. Ed. 860 (1904). Where
the commission is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, its subpoenas, if reasonably
definite, no more operate as unlawful searches and seizures than those of an
ordinary court of law. See Essgee Co. of China v. United States, 262 U. S. 151,
43 S. Ct. 514, 67 L. Ed. 917 (1923). The federal courts have not interfered with
investigations pending before the Federal Trade Commission to determine
whether any person or corporation is engaging in unfair methods of competition
in violation of Section 5 of the Act, where the investigations have been made upon
complaint lodged with the Commission charging the violations. Federal Trade
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1908 to the case of Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission.7
In that case, the United States Supreme Court denied the power of the
commission, in the absence of an investigation upon complaint, to com-
pel an officer of a carrier under scrutiny to disclose his individual
stock holdings in another carrier. Subsequently, in Smith v. Interstate
Commerce Commission,8 the principles of the Harriman case were con-
sidered inapplicable to an investigation by the commission of amounts
which certain common carriers had contributed to political campaign
funds, the court recognizing, inter alia, the public interest in the relation
between the rates of a carrier and its expenditures. The Harriman case
was not expressly overruled, and although the two cases may be techni-
cally distinguished, 9 a concession by the court to the cause of efficient
law enforcement is clearly recognizable.10
The question as to whether the comparative liberality of the decision
would have universal application was answered in the negative by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.1
Commission v. Nulomoline Co. 254 F. 988 (1918); T. C. Hurst & Son v. Federal
Trade Commission, 268 F. 874 (1920); Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v.
Federal Trade Commission, 280 F. 45 (1922); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 32 F. (2d) 966 (1929). Also, Federal statutes authorizing ad-
ministrative agencies to require periodic records and reports have been sustained.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612, 31
S. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878 (1911); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912).
7 211 U. S. 407, 29 S. Ct. 115, 53 L. Ed. 253 (1908), wherein Mr. Justice Holmes
remarked: " . . . the power to require testimony is limited, as it usually is in
English-speaking countries, at least, to the only cases where the sacrifice of
privacy is necessary-those where the investigations concern a specific breach of
the law." 211 U. S. 407, at 419-420.
8 245 U. S. 33, 38 S. Ct. 30, 62 L. Ed. 135 (1917).
9 One feature in particular may be noted: The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion Act was amended after the decision in the Harriman case. Prior to the deci-
sion, the Act, sec. 13, read: "Said Commission shall in like manner investigate
any complaint forwarded by the railroad commissioner or the railroad commis-
sion of any State or Territory, at the request of such commissioner or commis-
sion, and may institute any inquiry on its own motion in the same manner and
to the same effect as though the complaint had been made."
After the decision, sec. 13 read: " . . . and the Interstate Commerce Commission
shall have full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own
motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which a complaint
is authorized to be made, to or before said Commission by any provision of this
Act, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of
this Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act."
10 That the Smith case overruled the Harriman case has been the conclusion of
some writers. Cf. Investigatory Powers of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Anonymous (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 819, and Handler, "The Constitutionality of
Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission." (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 708
and 905. A number of decisions intervening between the Smith and Harriman
cases have had attributed to them the effect of severely limiting the scope of the
latter case. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S.
407, 31 S. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878 (1911); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Good-
rich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912).
11 264 U. S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 336, 68 L. Ed. 696 (1924), wherein Mr. Justice Holmes,
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There, the Federal Trade Commission, purporting to act under the
authority of a Senate resolution and the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 12 undertook a general investigation of the trade practices of the
defendant and other companies, and in the course of the proceedings
demanded from the company its correspondence and telegrams with
again speaking for the Court, said: "The mere facts of carrying on a commerce
not confined within state lines, and of being organized as a corporation, do not
make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad company now may be...
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the 4th Amendment would
be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize one of its subordinate
agencies to sweep all out traditions into the fire . . . and to direct fishing expedi-
tions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of
crime." 264 U. S. 298, at 305-306. "The investigations and complaints seem to have
been only on hearsay or suspicion: but even if they were induced by substantial
evidence under oath, the rudimentary principles of justice that we have laid down
would apply. We cannot attribute to Congress an intent to defy the 4th Amend-
ment, or even to come so near to doing so as raise a serious question of consti-
tutional law." 264 U. S. 298, at 307.
12 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 41-51, § 46 provides in part: "The commission shall also have
power-
Investigation of corporations. (a) To gather and compile information concern-
ing, and to investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct, prac-
tices, and management of any corporation engaged in commerce, excepting banks
and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, and its relation to
other corporations and to individuals, associations, and partnerships.
Reports by corporations. (b) To require, by general or special orders, corpora-
tions engaged in commerce, excepting banks, and common carriers subject to the
Act to regulate commerce, or any class of them, or any of them, respectively, to
file with the commission in such form as the commission may prescribe annual
or special, or both 'annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific
question-s, furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as to
the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other
corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective corporations filing
such reports or answers in writing. Such reports and answers shall be made under
oath, or otherwise, as the commission may prescribe, and shall be filed with the
commission within such reasonable period as the commission may prescribe,
unless additional time be granted in any case by the commission.
Investigations of violations of antitrust statutes. (d) Upon the direction of the
President or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating
to any alleged violations of the antitrust Acts by any corporation." § 49 provides,
in part:
"For the purposes of this subdivision of this chapter the commission, or its duly
authorized agent or agents, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the
purpose of examination, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any
corporation being investigated or proceeded against; and the commission shall
have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under
investigation. Any member of the commission may sign subpoenas, and mem-
bers and examiners of the commission may administer oaths and affirmations,
examine witnesses, and receive evidence.
Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evidence,
may be required from any place in the United States, at any designated place of
hearing. And in case of disobedience to a subpoena the commission may invoke
the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testi-
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jobbers and wholesalers over a period of one year. The refusal of de-
fendant to comply was upheld on the grounds that the Act did not
authorize the inquiry in the absence of a pending investigation on com-
plaint, and that the demand was too broad and sweeping and without
foundation. This decision continued as an expression of the governing
doctrine until 1933 when the case of Bartlett Frazier Company v. Hyde,i3
created an exception in cases involving businesses "affected with a public
interest." In that case, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the power
of the Department of Agriculture, under the Grain Futures Act, 14 to
require access to books and records of grain brokers on the Chicago
Board of Trade.
In the instant case, the respondent relied upon the state of the law
as outlined above, insisting that the situation was controlled by the de-
cision in the American Tobacco Company case. On this argument, the
Court distinguished the cases on the ground that the Federal Trade
Commission claimed an unlimited right of access to the company's
papers, while here the Administrator's demand was expressed in lawful
process and confined to specific documents easily distinguished and
clearly described. This appears to be a distinction without substance.
In both cases the documents demanded were the only ones by which
the respective agencies could determine whether violations had oc-
curred; in both cases the documents were specified as exactly as the
names thereof would permit, the difference in the periods covered by
the papers in the two cases being merely one of degree; and in neither
case had a complaint been filed or a specific investigation undertaken.
A more material, although not necessarily controlling, distinction may
be found in the provisions of the Act, as recognized by the Court, on the
basis that the provisions authorize the Administrator to investigate any
industry "to determine whether any person has violated any provision
of this Act, or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of
this Act," and, further, that other provisions authorize the Administrator
to make any regulations and to require the keeping of records "as nec-
essary or appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act
or the regulations or orders thereunder."'1 5 The Federal Trade Com-
mony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence.
Upon application of the Attorney General of the United States, at the request of
the commission, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus commanding any person or corporation to comply with
the provisions of this subdivision of this chapter or any order of the commission
made in pursuance thereof."
The Senate Resolution was put aside as not based on any alleged violations of
the Anti-Trust Act as required by § 6(d), supra, and the case was considered on
the basis of the authority claimed under § 9.
18 65 F. (2d) 350, (1933), cert. den. 290 U. S. 654, 54 S. Ct. 70, 78 L. Ed. 567 (1933).
14 7 U. S. C. A. H§ 1-17a. Now the "Commodity Exchange Act."
15 Fair Labor Standards Act, § 11.
"INVESTIGATIONS, INSPECTIONS, AND RECORDS
Sec. 11. (a) The Administrator or his designated representatives may investi-
gate and gather data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and prac-
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mission Act, in section 6,16 although authorizing investigations and the
requiring of reports, does not expressly give that authority for the pur-
poses of enforcement of that Act. On the basis that the Fair Labor
Standards Act authorizes investigations to determine the existence of
violations while the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes investi-
gations in proof of violations after a complaint has been filed, the de-
cision in the instant case is sound even in view of the decisions before it.
However, significance must be attached to the fact that the instant de-
cision appears to sustain broad investigatory powers of the Administra-
tor, a question which has received no consideration in the American
Tobacco Company case and in cases before it. The Court in the instant
case made no reference to the Federal Trade Commission Act and did
not expressly refer to any distinction between general and specific
investigatory powers, other than to attribute the Administrator's power
to a definite intent on the part of Congress to promote the interests
of employees engaged in interstate commerce. It seems obvious, of
course, that Congress, in enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act,
similarly intended to promote the best interests of trade and commerce,
and in that light it may be taken that section 6 of that Act authorizes
investigations to determine the existence of violations, for there ap-
pears to be no distinction between the two Acts justifying different
rules for similar cases. Since the American Tobacco Company case
was decided sixteen years ago, it may be concluded that the instant
decision tacitly declares the principles there evolved inapplicable to the
functioning of modem administrative agencies.
In reaching its decision, the Court in the instant case observed that
the tests for lawful inspection of records were applicable alike to non-
tices of employment in any industry subject to this Act, and may enter and in-
spect such places and such records (and make such transcriptions thereof), ques-
tion such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters
as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has
violated any provision of this Act, or which may aid in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act. Except as provided in section 12 and in subsection (b) of
this section, the Administrator shall utilize the bureaus and divisions of the
Department of Labor for all the investigations and inspections necessary under
this section. Except as provided in section 12, the Administrator shall bring all
actions under section 17 to restrain violations of this Act."
(b) With the consent and cooperation of State agencies charged with the ad-
ministration of State labor laws, the Administrator and the Chief of the Children's
Bureau may, for the purpose of carrying out their respective functions and duties
under this Act, utilize the services of State and local agencies and their employ-
ees and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, may reimburse such State
and local agencies and their employees for services rendered for such purposes.
(c) Every employer subject to any provision of this Act or of any order issued
under this Act shall make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons em-
ployed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of
employment maintained by him, and shall preserve such records for such periods
of time, and shall make such reports therefrom to the Administrator as he shall
prescribe by regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement
of the provisions of this Act or the regulations or orders thereunder.
16 Supra, note 11.
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public as well as public utility corporations, and this respect justified
its position on its understanding of the phrase "affected with a public
interest" as defining a business subject to regulation in the interests
of the public under the commerce clause. Following the decision in
Munn v. Illinois,17 sustaining the power of the state of Illinois to regu-
late grain elevator charges on the ground that the business was affected
with a public interest, and until Nebbia v. New York,18 the phrase had
a restrictive application to businesses and occupation of only certain
types, and the magic formula was that state or federal regulation of
a business depended first upon the determination that the business
was of the required type. The Nebbia case, sustaining state regulation
of the milk industry over the objection that the industry was not af-
fected with a public interest, disposed of the phrase as definitive of a
closed concept and determined that any business, which under the cir-
cumstances furnished an adequate reason for regulation, was subject
to governmental control for the public good.
In the instant case, as adequate reason for regulation was found
to exist because of the circumstance that respondent was engaged in
interstate commerce and the labor relations of a corporation engaged
in interstate commerce substantially affect that commerce, 19 and since
Congress, in legislating with respect to interstate commerce is acting
in the public interest, it may authorize an administrative agency to
inspect books and records of and to require the disclosure of informa-
tion by a particular business, regardless of whether there is any pre-
existing probable cause to suspect violations of law and regardless of
whether the business is a public or private corporation. This broad
language, without qualification, suggests that any business engaged in
interstate commerce is "affected with a public interest" to the extent
that it is subject to mandate of Congress under the commerce clause,
intimating a reversion to the closed-concept theory existing prior to
the decision in the Nebbia case, and further intimating that the fact
of interstate commerce being present, there is no limit on what aspect
of the business may be controlled "for the public good." Only meager
qualification can be found in later portions of the opinion, wherein the
Court recognizes that the affairs of a private corporation may be less
public than those of a public utility corporation and that the scope of
the regulation of the former is correspondingly more limited. How-
ever, it may be assumed that these observations by the Court are by
way of dicta, attributable to the zeal of the Court is asserting a def-
inite position with regard to upholding the investigatory powers of ad-
ministrative commission under proper authorization by Congress.
Conceding the decision in the instant case as authorizing administra-
tive investigations for the purpose of disclosing violations of an act of
17 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
is 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
19 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed.
893 (1937).
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Congress, without regard to whether the business under scrutiny is
public or private, it must be remembered that this power is limited
by the requirement that the exercise thereof must not be unreasonable.
Accordingly, the concession to efficient law enforcement appears to be
properly granted in view of the present day conditions.
H. M. KNOTH
TRUSTS - IANAGEMENT AND DISPoSAL OF TRUST PROPERTY - WHAT
LAW GOVERNS THE ADMINISTRATION OF A TESTAMENTARY TRUST OF MOV-
ABLES AS TO THE LEGALIY OF TRUST INVESTMENTS. - The question of what
law should govern the administration of a trust of movables where the
settlor dies domiciled in one state, and the designated corporate trustee
and other operative factors are located in another state, the settlor's
intention being unexpressed, has received novel treatment by the Pre-
rogative Court of New Jersey in the recent case of In re Johnston's
Estate.' In this case, the settlor died domiciled in New Jersey after
having lived most of his life in Pennsylvania where he had business
connections with and where his son was still an officer of the corporation
he named trustee in his will. The trustee invested part of the trust
property in certain real estate mortgages which were non-legal trust
investments according to New Jersey law but legal according to Pennsyl-
vania law. In a bill brought by the trustee to approve his account in the
New Jersey court, the beneficiaries sought to have the account sur-
charged by the amount of the loss incurred through these investments.
The court allowed the surcharge, holding that there was an inference
of intention to be gained from the will that administration was to be
governed by New Jersey law. The court found this inference from three
factors: first, the New Jersey decisions indicated the local rule to be
that administration was to be according to the law of the domicile of
the testator, and this testator was presumed to have made his will in
light of this law; second, the Restatement of Conflict of Laws was
not published at the time of the execution of the will and so its rule
establishing a contrary presumption where a foreign corporation is named
trustee could not have influenced the testator; third, under Pennsylvania
law the trust res would have been subject to a personal property tax,
whereas it escaped this particular tax in New Jersey. The court took the
position that in the absence of expressed intention to the contrary, the
law of the domicile of the testator would be applied.
Express directions by a testator as to what law shall govern ad-
ministration are generally controlling, but no uniformity of decision has
been found on the question of what law shall govern the administration
of a testamentary trust in conflict of laws situations where no intention
can reasonably be found.2 Several rules have been suggested. Section
1 127 N.J. Eq. 576, 14 A. (2d) 469 (1940).
2 Questions of validity are uniformly held to be governed by the law of the state
of the domicile of the testator, except in the case of charitable trusts. See Cross v.
United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125, 15 L.R.A. 606, 27 Am. St. Rep.
597 (1892). And in the case of trusts inter vivos, the courts have shown a willing-
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298 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,3 provides that in the ab-
sence of a contrary intention to be gained from the will, the law of the
testator's domicile will govern. Comment C to this section declares
that where a foreign corporation is named trustee a presumption is
raised that the law of the trustee's domicile will control.4 No cases have
been found in which the existence of a foreign corporate trustee, without
other factors, has been held sufficient to require administration ac-
cording to the law of the state in which the trustee does business. Many
courts have refused to follow Comment C even where other operative
factors were present in the state of the trustee's domicile.5 In cases
where the law of the trustee's domicile was held to apply, other im-
portant factors were also present in that state.6
Another solution, favored by Professor Cook, is that the law of "the
jurisdiction with which, on the whole, the trust seems to have the most
substantial connection" should govern the administration of the trust.7
Under this view the common operative factors, (1) testator's domicile
at time of death, (2) trustee's domicile at that time, (3) beneficiaries'
domiciles at time of testator's death, (4) place where trust is to be
administered, and (5) situs of the property, would be eliminated as
single decisive factors, and all of the logically relevant elements would
be considered together. This seems to be the process which most courts
have followed, although with great variance as to what factors should be
considered and as to the relative importance to be assigned to each.
Walter W. Land, in his new work,8 has given an able analysis of the
factors which courts consider on this question. He lists the following
thirteen factors: (1) domicile of the testator at time of execution; (2)
place of execution; (3) domicile of the trustee at time of execution; (4)
ness to look to all the operative facts in determining which situs the settlor in-
tended the trust to have. Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920);
Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 F. 501, (Pa., 1904). And see Beale, "Living Trusts of
Movables in the Conflict of Laws," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 969 (1932).
3 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 298.
4 "Foreign trust company appointed trustee. If the testator appoints as trustee
a trust company of another state, presumptively his intention is that the trust
should be administered in the latter state; the trust will, therefore, be adminis-
tered according to the law of the latter state."
5 Farnum v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives, 87 N.J. Eq. 108, 99 A.
145 (1916), affmd. 87 N.J. Eq. 652, 101 A. 1053 (1917); In re Avery's Estate, 45
Misc. 529, 92 N.Y.S. 974 (1904); In re Davis' Estate, 127 Misc. 701, 217 N.Y.S. 605
(1926); Estate of Henry Bunn, 95 N.J.L.J. 2808 (1936); In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343,
192 A. 397 (1937).
6 Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200 A. 791 (1938); Keeney v. Morse, 71 App.
Div. 104, 75 N.Y.S. 728 (1902); In re Vanneck's Will, 158 Misc. 704, 286 N.Y.S.
489 (1936); Estate of Cornelia v. N. Bedford, 96 N.Y.L.J. (1879), Nov. 27, 1936;
In re Bates' Will, 168 Misc. 526, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 628 (1938); In re McAuliffe's
Estate, 167 Misc. 783, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 605 (1938); In re Risher's Will, 227 Wis. 104,
277 N.W. 160 (1938).
T 19 Col. L. R. 486 (1919), and see Swabenland, "The Conflict of Laws in Admin-
istration of Express Trusts of Personal Property," 45 Yale L. J. 438 (1936).
8 Trusts in the Conflict of Laws, 1940, § 36.1.
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location of the trust res at time of execUtion; (5) domicile of benefici-
aries at time of execution; (6) language of the will (indicative of in-
tent); (7) implied intention of the testator; (8) domicile of the testator at
time of death; (9) place of probate; (10) location of trust property at
time of death and thereafter; (11) domicile of trustee at time of death
and thereafter; (12) domicile of beneficiaries at time of death and there-
after; (13) place in which the business of the trust is carried on. The
first six, the writer says, are factors properly going to the question of
intention since they are the only factors in existence at the time of
execution. The seventh, implied intention, he identifies as a catch-all
which some courts use to express the court's own conclusion as to
the law to govern in phraseology of intention of the testator.
9 Such use
of implied intention as an operative factor is open to question even in
jurisdictions where the "implied intent" technique is followed, since
"implied intent" is the ultimate conclusion and not properly a factor
leading to it.
It is in regard to the last six factors that most of the differences of
opinion will be found to exist. Section 298 of the Restatement is an ex-
pression of the widely-held feeling that the domicile of the testator at the
time of his death is so important a factor as to be decisive even standing
alone. Thus we find the court in the instant case declaring that it would
apply the law of the domicile of the testator in absence of express in-
tention to the contrary, despite the existence of potent factors in another
jurisdiction. And in the earlier case of Lozier v. Lozier,
10 relied on by
the New Jersey court, the Ohio court applied Ohio law because of domi-
cile of the testator and probate of the will in Ohio, although execution,
domicile of the trustees, and the trust property were all in New York.
Courts following this rule also place strong emphasis on the place of
probate, even to the extent of finding from the supposed power to take
jurisdiction the justification for making the local law determinative of
questions of administration." However, many courts which have applied
the law of the trustee's domicile and of the place where the trust is car-
ried on, have minimized the relationship between trustee and the pro-
bate court, even going so far as to hold that there is no duty to qualify
in the domiciliary state and no duty to account.
12 It would seem that the
9 Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N.J. Eq. 186, 41 A. 252 (1898); Lozier v. Lozier, 99
Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919); In re Estate of Beckwith v. Cooper, 258 Ill. App.
411 (1930); In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343, 192 A. 397 (1937); In re McAuliffe's Estate, 167
Misc. 783, 4 N.Y. S. (2d) 605 (1938); In re Risher's Will, 227 Wis. 104, 277 N.W. 160
(1938). And note how the court in the instant case used an "inference of inten-
tion" to buttress its choice of the law of the domicile of the testator.
10 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919).
11 Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919); McCullough's Ex'rs. v.
McCullough, 44 N.J. Eq. 313, 14 A. 642 (1888); In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343, 192 A, 397
(1937); Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 N.J. Eq. 186, 41 A. 252 (1898); Marsh v. Marsh's
Ex'rs., 73 N.J. Eq. 99, 67 A. 706 (1907); In re Bradford's Estate, 165 Misc. 736,
1 N.Y. S. (2d) 539 (1937).
12 In re Risher's Will, 227 Wis. 104, 277 N.W. 160 (1938); In re McAuliffe's
Estate, 167 Misc. 783, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 605 (1938); In re Bates' Will, 168 Misc. 526,
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trustee in the instant case might have been better advised to bring the
suit in Pennsylvania and urge this doctrine.
Most courts which have considered the location of the trust property
as an operative factor have treated it as being at the domicile of the
testator.U3 Others have resisted the doctrine of ambulatory situs of per-
sonalty and have treated location of trust property as one of the import-
ant operative elements. 14 Domicile of the trustee, as we have shown,
is of great importance, though not singly determinative even where
trustee is a trust company. Domicile of the beneficiaries is not usually
considered important, 15 although it is often considered with testator's
domicile or trustee's domicile to add weight to the reasons for selecting
one or the other of these more determinative factors. 16 The place in
which the business of the trust is to be carried on is another of the make-
weight factors. 17
In light of the foregoing it does not seem unreasonable to criticize
the court for its approach to this problem. As to the inference of intention
which the court claimed to find, it need only be said that if an inten-
tion could be found it should have been controlling. And the decision to
make the domicle of the testator determinative, although in line with
earlier decisions of the New Jersey courts, fails to recognize the modern
trend toward a consideration of all the operative factors involved. In
applying this set rule of decision, regardless of the placing of the other
operative factors, the court has placed a substantial burden on the for-
eign corporate trustee, both in requiring him to determine which law
should govern and in requiring administration according to the law of a
foreign state. And the inflexibility of this holding raises the possibility
of an irreconcilable conflict with jurisdictions following a more liberal
rule where different causes arise independently in both states.
DAVID G. MACDONALD
WILLS--CONSTRUCTIoN-WHETHER EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE Is ADMIssIBLE
WHERE THE WILL MIsDESCRIBEs LAND DEvIsED.-The Supreme Court of Illinois,
in deciding Koelmel v. Kaelin,' upheld the admission of extrinsic evidence
to explain a devise of real estate which was erroneously described in
the will. The particular language of the will was as follows: "I give and
bequeath to my son Rudolph Koelmel the fol. tracts of land... The South
West quarter of the South West quarter of Section No. Eleven (11).
5 N.Y. S. (2d) 628 (1938). And see Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Ferris, 67 App.
Div. 1, 73 N.Y.S. 475 (1901); Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N.Y.S. 728
(1902).
'3 In re Avery's Estate, 45 Misc. 529, 92 N.Y.S. 974 (1904); In re Cronin, 326 Pa.
343, 192 A. 397 (1937); Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919).
14 Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104, 75 N.Y.S. 728 (1902); In re Vanneck's
Will, 158 Misc. 704, 286 N.Y.S. 489 (1936); Allen v. Tate, 6 F. (2d) 139 (1925).
15 Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919).
16 Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 F. 501 (1904); Keeney v. Morse, 71 App. Div. 104,
75 N.Y. S. 728 (1902).
17 Mercer v. Buchanan, 132 F. 501 (1904).
1 374 Ill. 204, 29 N.E. (2d) 106 (1940).
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Except one half acre in S.E. corner of said tract." The will contained no
residuary clause. The proof aliunde was that the only tract of land owned
by the testator and containing thirty-nine and one-half acres was located
not in section 11 but in section 1. The only question raised in the case
was whether this extrinsic evidence was admissible for consideration
with the testamentary description for the purpose of identifying the
tract of land devised. The court deleted the words and numerals "of
Section No. Eleven (11)" and read the will as disposing of the thirty-nine
and one-half acres that the testator owned, the court being apparently
satisfied that the language remaining after the false words were can-
celled was sufficient, when considered in the light of the circumstances
surrounding the testator at the time he made his will, to disclose the
testator's intent to devise the land in question. 2 The fact that the land
described, after the deletion, and the land actually owned by the testator
contained exactly the same acreage and that each had excepted therefrom
one-half acre in the same corner, was deemed important. It is to be noted,
however, that nothing but the extrinsic evidence located the property. In
reaching this result, the court did not indicate that it was aware of the
confusion existing among the earlier Illinois cases involving inaccurate
testamentary description of real estate.
Although the problem of inaccurate description arises also in deeds,
contracts, and other writings, a special phase of the problem is presented
in cases involving wills, principally because equity has no power to
reform a will. 3 But it is generally accepted that the deletion of false
portions of a devise or bequest is not reformation but interpretation.
4
The discussion below is therefore limited to Illinois cases concerning
wills, and especially wills devising real estate.
The instant case represents but one of a number of classes of cases
of this type, belonging to that class where the devise is incorrect as to
section, township, or range. Other classes of cases involve devises
correctly placing the land as to section, township, and range, but misplac-
ing the tract as to quarter-section; and devises which are correct as to
township, range, section, and quarter-section but which incorrectly locate
the property within the quarter-section. Each class of cases may be
further subdivided as to cases of the type in which the devise contains
additional description of the property by metes and bounds, or acreage
by some other name, by reference in the will to the property in terms of
other property owned by the testator or some other person, or by express
or implied reference to the property as belonging to the testator. In all
cases, there is room for the application of the maxim falsa demonstratio
non nocet, so that description determined according to extrinsic evidence
to be false can be stricken as surplusage. The maxim has received
2 Page, Wills, § 487, 819; Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940), § 2476; Patch v.
White, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. Ed. 860 (1885); Cochran v. Cochran, 277 Ill. 244, 115
N.E. 142 (1917).
3 Wigmore, op. cit., § 2476.
4 For a review of this phase of equity jurisdiction see, Henry Schofield, "So-
Called Equity Jurisdiction to Construe and Reform Wills," 6 Ill. L. Rev. 485.
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varying treatment in application, in some instances being rejected in toto5
The implication in the later Illinois cases is that the Illinois Supreme
Court will apply the maxim, subject to the rule that the words remaining
after the deletion of the false description are sufficient to identify the
property.8 It follows, therefore, that all cases present simply questions
of the sufficiency of the additional description and of the nature and
amount of the extrinsic evidence required.
7
For the purpose of this note, only those cases will be considered in
which the devise describes the land merely by township, range, section,
quarter-section, and portion of the quarter-section, for it cannot be agreed
that the language referring to the excepted half-acre in the instant case,
standing alone, as it does, is sufficient to identify the tract in question.
Not in all cases has the Illinois Supreme Court deemed acreage or
fractions thereof sufficient additional description.8
Considering the instant case on this basis, the factual situation pre-
sented does not differ materially from that presented in Kurtz v. Hibner,9
decided in Illinois in 1870. In that case, it was said: "There is no ambiguity
in this case, as is urged. When we look at the will it is all plain and
clear. It is only the proof, aliunde, which creates any doubt, and such
5 The failure of the courts to accept the maxim uniformly is due to the presence
of three well established, albeit somewhat superficial, rules of construction; (1)
the rule against disturbing a plain meaning; (2) the rule against alteration
because of a mere mistake; and (3) the rule requiring that the remaining words
be sufficiently definite in order that the devise be not void for uncertainty. The
first and second rules operate in lieu of the maxim; the third rule merely qualifies
the maxim in those jurisdictions not accepting the maxim unreservedly.
6 Page, op. cit., § 487, 819.
7 It is possible here to eliminate a discussion of those cases where the will
expressly or impliedly refers to the property as the testator's, by the use of such
words as "my property" or their equivalent, for in those cases such reference
constitutes sufficient additional description. Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L. Ed.
860 (1885); Emmert v. Hays, 89 Ill. 11 (1878); Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554 (1881);
Allen v. Bowen, 105 Ill. 361 (1883); Johnson v. Gastman, 291 Ill. 516, 126 N.E. 172
(1920); Leininger v. Reichle, 317 Ill. 625, 148 N.E. 384 (1925); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 327 li. 85, 158 N.E. 356 (1927).
Likewise to be eliminated are those cases where the additional description is
fairly detailed and would serve as an adequate description in the absence of any
other. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 297 Ill. 338, 130 N.E. 771 (1921); Bimslager v.
Bimslager, 323 Ill. 303, 154 N.E. 135 (1926).
8 Acreage ignored: Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill. 514 (1880); Bishop v. Morgan, 82
Ill. 35 (1876); Williams v. Williams, 189 Ill. 500, 59 N.E. 966 (1901); Lomax v.
Lomax, 218 Ill. 629, 75 N.E. 1076 (1905). Acreage of some importance: Whitcomb
v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 40 N.E. 553 (1895); Huffman v. Young, 170 Ill. 290, 49 N.E.
570 (1897); Vestal v. Garrett, 197 Il. 398, 64 N.E. 345 (1902).
9 55 Ill. 514 (1870). In this case, the devises were as follows: "I give and bequeath
to my daughter . . .all that tract . . . of land . . . in Joliet . . .and described
as follows: the west half of the south-west quarter of section 32, township 35, range
10, containing 80 acres, more or less, together with all the appurtenances thereunto
belonging. . . . " And: "I give and bequeath to my grand-son . . . all that . . .
land described as the south half of the east half of the south quarter of section 31,
in township 35, range 10, containing 40 acres, more or less." An offer of proof
that the testator owned but one 80 acre tract in township 35 and that it was
located in section 31 instead of section 32 was rejected. As to the other devise, a
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proof we hold to be inadmissible.' u0 The decision has been attacked
and defended," and has by some authorities been considered overruled
by later cases. 12 That the case has not been expressly overruled is certain.
The decisions in Lomax v. Lomax,13 and in Graves v. Rose, 14 on almost
identical facts, would not support a conclusion that the decision has
been tacitly overruled. In Stevenson v. Stevenson,'5 the devise was incor-
rect as to township and range, and extrinsic evidence was excluded on
the authority of the Kurtz case.16
Although it is true that extrinsic evidence has been admitted in some
Illinois cases where the additional description does not take the form of a
reference by ownership or some other generally accepted designation, it
will be seen that these cases are principally those of the class in which
the devise is correct in all respects but simply misplaces the property in
the quarter-section. 17 In still other cases, where the quarter-section is
incorrectly specified, and the devise contains no adequate additional
similar offer of proof was rejected. The evidence as to both devises also included
proof that the respective devisees had resided on the lands as tenants, and this
was likewise rejected. It was held that the case presented nothing more than a
mistake, which could not be corrected.
10 Ibid. at p. 529.
11 Kales, "Considerations Preliminary to the Practice of the Art of Interpreting
Writings-More Especially Wills," 28 Yale L.J. 33; Joseph Warren, "The Progress
of the Law, 1918-1919," 33 Harv. L. Rev. 556.
12 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 429 et seq., suggests that Kurtz v. Hibner is tacitly
overruled by Collins v. Capps, 235 Ill. 560, 85 N.E. 934 (1908).
13 218 Ill. 629, 75 N.E. 1076 (1905).
14 246 Ill. 76, 92 N.E. 601 (1910).
15 285 Ill. 486, 121 N.E. 202 (1918).
16 The opinion in the Kurtz case did not refer to possibilities under falsa
demonstratio non nocet. The decision is explained by Wigmore, op. cit., as the
result of a hidebound adherence to the rule against overthrowing a document
because of a mere mistake. The case thus illustrates the effect of the second
obstacle to a clear appreciation of the maxim. See note 3, supra. The case is also
an example of bad practice in offering the extrinsic proof, counsel insisting that
"31" should be "32" instead of asking for interpretation "from without" by a
request that the devise be read as if the incorrect description did not appear.
See Wigmore, op. cit., § 2476.
The only Illinois cases sustaining devises incorrect as to section are those in
which the respective wills expressly or impliedly referred to the property as that
of the testator. Emmert v. Hays, 89 Ill. 11 (1878); Allen v. Bowen, 105 Ill. 361
(1883), incorrect lot number; Daniel v. Crusenbury, 279 Ill. 367, 116 N.E. 833
(1917); Johnson v. Gastman, 291 Ill. 516, 126 N.E. 172 (1920); Leininger v. Reichle,
317 Ill. 625, 148 N.E. 384 (1925), incorrect range number.
In one other case, an incorrect reference to township and range was deleted
in view of additional description of the property with reference to its location
as adjoining that already owned by the devisee. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 297 Ill.
338, 130 N.E. 771 (1921). See also Bimslager v. Bimslager, 323 Ill. 303, 154
N.E. 135 (1926).
17 Douglas v. Bolinger, 228 Ill. 23, 81 N.E. 787 (1907). This case, typical of this
class, concerned a will in which the testator devised the north half of the northwest
quarter of a section whereas he actually owned the west half of that quarter. The
word north was cancelled. See also, Huffman v. Young, 170 ll. 290, 49 N.E. 570
(1897); Felkel v. O'Brien, 231 Ill. 329, 83 N.E. 170 (1907); Collins v. Capps, 235
Il. 560, 85 N.E. 934 (1908).
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description, the decisions are about equally divided between refusing
and admitting extrinsic evidence.' 8 It seems clear that cases of either
of the classes last referred to are somewhat different from those of the
type represented by Kurtz v. Hibner and the instant case. In the former
cases, the problem of locating the property is at least confined to one
section and in some cases to a quarter-section; consequently a lesser
amount of extrinsic proof is required. Yet, the difference does not seem
to be of sufficient magnitude to justify two governing doctrines. In both
classes of cases, the defect is a mistake in the description; in either case,
the extrinsic evidence must ultimately locate the property; and in either
case the nature of the proof aliunde is of substantially the same nature.
In cases where the property is referred to in the will as belonging
to the testator, the problem, as stated previously, presents no difficulty.
But, as stated in Stevenson v. Stevenson, "It is never permissible to strike
from a will false words of a description of real estate and to put or read
into a will the words 'my property' . . . or their equivalent, when not
authorized to do so by the very language . . . in the will."'19 On the other
hand, it is stated in Collins v. Capps, an earlier Illinois case, "The pre-
sumption is that the testator intended to dispose of property which he
owned."' 20 And in Brown v. Ray, a comparatively recent case, it was
said: ". . . we have gone to the utmost limit in searching the provisions
of a will to find words that will identify the object of the testator's bounty
and the property devised by him and give effect to the same as he
expressed it, if that can be done without the addition to or subtraction of
words that will change the plain meaning of his will as he has expressed
it, and whenever parol evidence, under proper rules of law announced,
will put the court in a better position to understand the will such evidence
will be permitted." 21 There is much to be said in favor of the presumption
that a testator intends to devise only property which he owns. As a prac-
tical matter, there is little reason for supposing that a testator would
devise property that he did not own. Although it was common according
to Roman custom for a testator to devise property owned by another
person, 22 no such precedent exists in the common law. Adopting the view
that it must be presumed that the testator intends to devise only his own
property, each will would include, as a matter of law, adequate general
18 Refused: Bishop v. Morgan, 82 Il. 35 (1876); Bingel v. Volz, 142 Ill. 214, 31
N.E. 13 (1893); Graves v. Rose, 246 Ill. 76, 92 N.E. 601 (1910). Admitted: Whitcomb
v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 40 N.E. (1895), said by Page, op. cit., § 487, to have
"tacitly overruled" Bingle v. Volz, supra. Gano v. Gano, 239 Il. 539, 88 N.E. 146
(1909). See Schofield, op. cit., p. 493, n. 28, for what appears to be a proper ground
for the decision in Gano v. Gano, supra.
19 285 Ill. 486, 494, 121 N.E. 202 (1918).
20 235 Ill. 560, 564, 85 N.E. 934 (1908). See also three-judge dissenting opinion
in Stevenson v. Stevenson, 285 Ill. 486, 121 N.E. 202 (1918), and the dissent in
Graves v. Rose, 246 Ill. 76, 92 N.E. 60 (1910). In the Collins case, the residuary
clause gave "all the balance of my property"; hence, there was no impelling
reason to imply the testator's intent.
21 314 Ill. 570, 580, 145 N.E. 676 (1924).
22 Radin on Roman Law (1927), § 162.
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description of the subject-matter devised, and there would be involved
merely the process of determining by extrinsic proof just what property
the testator did own.
The instant opinion makes no express reference to an adoption of
this presumption as part of the Illinois law on this subject. On the other
hand, the opinion contains no reference to the Kurtz or Lomax cases as
stating the ruling doctrine in this state. The tendency of the recent
Illinois cases seems to be toward a view opposite to that expressed in
those cases last referred to. In view of the fact that the Kurtz case was
not referred to by the court in the instant opinion, along with the fact
that the two cases are very similar, it may be concluded that the Kurtz
case is no longer law in Illinois. This conclusion does not lose sight of the
fact that the instant case relied on two other aspects of the situation for
its decision, namely, the absence of a residuary clause as strengthening
the presumption against intestacy, 23 and the fact that the total value of the
testators' property was $2,500, the devise being conditioned upon the
paying of $500 to four other heirs, which limited the plaintiff to a net
value of $500. This latter circumstance demonstrating the testator's intent
to distribute his property equally. However, nothing appeared in Kurtz v.
Hibner to indicate the presence of a residuary clause. At the same time,
the proof in that case of the devisees' occupancy as tenants of the lands
in question was clearly indicative of the testator's intent to make the
expected distribution of his property. Looking at the two cases in this
light, the decision in the instant case is either the end of, or a continuation
of, the confusion existing among the Illinois cases. The conclusion that
the decision indicates the former is not without support. H. M. KNOTH
WILLS-PERsONS WHO MAY OPPOSE PROBATE-RIGHT OF JUDGMENT CREDI-
Toas or HEm TO CONTEST Wmu.- The question of whether a judgment
creditor of an heir at law can attack a will which prevents property
from passing to his debtor arose in the case of In re Duffy's Estate.1
The testator left a will and codicil, by which he bequeathed and devised
his property equally among his thirteen children with provisions for
creating a spendthrift trust to cover share of his son George, the debtor.
The estate consisted of both personal and real property. The day before
proof of the will was to be made, the Fairbank State Bank, the creditor
of George, filed objections to the will and codicil. The executor filed a
demurrer stating that the contestant was not such a party in interest as
could contest the will and the probate court sustained the demurrer.
The contestant appealed and the Iowa Supreme Court held that a
judgment creditor had a sufficient interest so as to maintain a contest
against the will and codicil.
The requirements are substantially the same in most states; that any
person who would be an interested party can contest a will. Generally
an interested party is defined as any person who would be interested in
23 See Felkel v. O'Brien, 231 Ill. 329, 83 N.E. 170 (1907).
1 292 N.W. 165 (Iowa, 1940).
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the property if the will were set aside, or any person whose financial in-
terest would be directly advanced in case the will were set aside.
The majority of states that have decided the issue agree that a
general creditor has no such interest as to bring him under the statute
as an interested party.
2
However, there is a general conflict as to whether or not a judgment
creditor, who has a lien on the property of the debtor, would be so
directly benefited as to entitle him to contest the will. In some juris-
dictions it has been held that the lien of a judgment gives the creditor
an interest in any land his debtor owns and that this interest is suffi-
ciently direct to make him an interested party within the meaning of
the statute.3
Those states which take the contrary view do so on the basis that
the judgment creditor's lien is in the nature of a mere remedy and
not a direct interest in the property itself.
4
The difference in views seems to turn about the conflicting notions
of the nature of the interest required. It was pointed out in Lee v. Keech,5
one of the cases denying a judgment creditor's right to contest a will,
that a lien is no property or right in the land itself but a mere right to
have it sold for the payment of the judgment. This seems to set up a
requirement of a tangible interest in land. The cases favoring the judg-
ment creditor consider a lien to be a sufficient interest even though it
does not constitute an estate in itself. In Watson v. Alderson6 the Mis-
souri court said, "It is not interest in the estate of the deceased that
authorized any person to contest a will under the statute, but an interest
in its devolution,-in the probate of will that determines that devolution."
And in Iowa where the statute requires notice of probate to be given to
"any person interested" and where a previous case 7 had interpreted that
to mean "beneficial interest" the court in the instant case said, "The
words 'beneficial interest' were not used in any narrow or technical
2 Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996, 74 Am. St. Rep. 63 (1899);
Keeler v. Lauer, 73 Kan. 338, 85 P. 541 (1906); Bank of Tennessee v. Nelson, 3
Head 634, 40 Tenn. 436 (1859); Ross' Estate v. Abrams, 239 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1922).
3 Smith v. Bradstreet, 16 Pick., (33 Mass.) 264 (1833); In re Langevin's Will, 45
Minn. 429, 47 N.W. 1133 (1891); Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478, 69
Am. St. Rep. 615 (1898); Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908); In re Cor-
yell's Will, 4 App. Div. 429, 39 N.Y. S. 508 (1896); In re Van Doren's Estate, 119
N.J. Eq. 80, 180 A. 841 (1935). There are numerous other opinions in which by
way of dicta, courts have approved this view. However, the cases cited are those
only in which the same precise question was in issue.
4 Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835, 46 A.L.R. 1488 (1926); In re Shepard's
Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895); Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So.
996, 74 Am. St. Rep. 63 (1899); Keeler v. Lauer, 73 Kan. 338, 85 P. 541 (1906). Here
also, only those cases which were exactly in point are cited. Many courts have
supported the view taken in these cases by the way of dicta.
5 Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835, 46 A.L.R. 1488 (1926).
6 Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478, 69 Am. St. Rep. 615 (1898).
T In re Stewart's Estate, 107 Iowa 117, 77 N.W. 574 (1898).
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sense. . . A 'beneficial interest' is one of value, worth, advantage, or
use to a person. One having such a thing of value is a 'person interest-
ed' . .
Conflicting policies bear on the determination of the problem. It is
not good policy to adopt a position which would enable one to avoid
payment of his debts when he has means at hand to acquire assets with
which to pay if he will but take the necessary steps, and which would
permit the debtor to connive at the probate of a void or voidable will in
the expectation that he will receive indirectly the benefits of his inherit-
ance. On the other hand it may be said that the legatees under the
will ought not to be harrassed and delayed by suits at the instance of
a multitude of disappointed creditors who may have but a slim support
for their charges and are merely stretching for a straw.
Neither the Illinois Supreme nor the Appellate court has passed on
the right of a lien creditor of an heir to contest a will which makes no
provision for the heir. The language of the Illinois Statute s is comparable
to that in other states, and "any person interested" has been explained
to mean "those interested in the settlement of the estate-that is, those
who will be directly affected, in a pecuniary sense, by its settlement."
This still leaves the question unanswered, because it is capable of being
said either way that a judgment creditor of an heir is or is not directly
affected in a pecuniary sense. And the commentators on the Probate
Act offer no solution.10  A. HsH
s Ill. Rev. Stat., 1939, Ch. 3, § 242.
9 McDonald v. White, 130 Ill. 493, 22 N.E. 599 (1889); Selden v. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, 239 IMl. 67, 87 N.E. 860 (1909).
10 Illinois Probate Act Annotated (Chicago: Foundation Press, Inc., 1940), p. 95.
